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INTRODUCTION

The billable hour has an image problem. It has become a scapegoat for all
the unpleasantries of law firm life: long hours, dull work, cantankerous
clients. Associates see the billable hour as the most visible symbol of their
bondage, an arch-capitalistic machine that transforms time into dollars and
bright-eyed young lawyers into fee-producing zombies.
So it should come as no surprise that lawyers and commentators have long
predicted the abolition of the billable hour. It skews incentives, they say; it
encourages inefficiency; it's just plain unpleasant! These calls have
accelerated in recent years, in part due to widely publicized law firm
misconduct in reporting hours.' All kinds of lawyers have joined the crusade,

* Jonathan H. Choi. Fellow, Classical Liberal Institute, New York University School of
Law; J.D., Yale Law School; B.A., Dartmouth College. Thanks to Edward B. Able, Anne L.
Alstott, Davis L. Banks, Creston W. Brown, David H. Choi, Amy Chua, Paul Connell, Carly E.
Finkenstadt, Lawrence R. Glosten, Lilai Guo, Henry B. Hansmann, Christopher B. Henry,
Vanessa L. McQuinn, John D. Morley, Erin E. Waldron, J. Alexander Zimmerman, and the
entire team of editors at the South CarolinaLaw Review for their terrific input.
1.
See, e.g., Susan Saab Fortney, I Don't Have Time to Be Ethical: Addressing the
Effects of Billable Hour Pressure, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 305, 315 (2003); Nathan Koppel, Study
Suggests Significant Billing Abuse, WALL ST. J.: LAW BLOG (May 1, 2007, 9:04 AM),
http://blogs.wsj. com/law/2007/05/01,/study-suggests-significant-billing-abuse; Peter Lattman,
Suit Offers a Peek at the Practiceof Inflating a Legal Bill, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Mar. 25,
2013, 3:36 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/25/suit-offers-a-peek-at-the-practice-ofpadding-a-legal-bill.
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from in-house counsel to the heads of some of the largest law firms in
America.2
At the same time, the billable hour has proven remarkably resilient against
campaigns for reform. Critics have rallied to abolish the billable hour virtually
since its invention. 3 For the past twenty years, legal academics and
professionals have routinely predicted the imminent demise of traditional
billing practices. 4 Yet, the billable hour is still by far the most popular billing
method today.'
To resolve this paradox, this Article delves into the history of the billable
hour, as well as the economics literature on agency theory. Prior literature has
suggested that law firms bill by the hour because they cannot bear the risk of
cost overruns, and that the use of the billable hour is determined by the
tradeoff between risk allocation and incentive costs. 6 This Article instead
proposes that the billable hour is a monitoringtool: a means by which a client
can impose discipline on its lawyer and compare the services of different
lawyers. This explains the timing of the billable hour's adoption-it became
the standard in the 1970s, just as large, sophisticated in-house legal
departments appeared and began to agitate for more cognizable metrics of
lawyer performance.

2.
See, e.g., STEVEN J. HARPER, THE LAWYER BUBBLE: A PROFESSION IN CRISIS 17175 (2013); Steven J. Harper, Opinion, The Tyranny ofthe Billable Hour, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28,
2013, at A25; Jonathan D. Glater, Billable Hours Giving Ground at Law Firms, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 30, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/business/worldbusiness/30iht-30hours.
19799084.html.
3.
For an early example, see generally Harry A. Ackley, Let's Throw Out the Hourly
Basis for Fees, 49 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1963, at 76, 76 (arguing that "setting fees on the basis of the
amount of time spent on a case is improper").
4.
See, e.g., Stephen W. Jones & Melissa Beard Glover, The Attack on Traditional
Billing Practices, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 293, 293 (1998); Brooke MacKenzie, Better
Value: Problems with the Billable Hour and the Viability of Value-Based Billing, 90 CAN B.
REV. 675, 679 (2011); Francis H. Musselman, Abandon the Billable Hour!, 67 N.Y. ST. B.J.,
July-Aug. 1995, at 28, 29; Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 749,
768-71 (discussing problems resulting from hourly billing and changes to expect from its
decline in use); Darlene Ricker, The Vanishing Hourly Fee, 80 A.B.A. J., Mar. 1994, at 66, 66;
David D. Rosenstein, For Whom the Bill Tolls: Quantity, Not Quality, Becomes the Goal when
Hourly Fees Prevail,81 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1995, at 120, 120; Scott Turow, The Billable HourMust
Die: It Rewards Inefficiency, It Makes Clients Suspicious, and It May Be Unethical, 93 A.B.A.
J., Aug. 2007, at 32, 37.
5. ALM LEGAL INTELLIGENCE, NAT'L LAW JOURNAL, 2012 SURVEY OF LAW FIRM
ECONOMICS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8-9 (2012).

6.

See infra Section II.A.
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Monitoring also explains the pattern of billable hour usage in law firms
today. Alternative billing methods-flat fees, contingent fees, etc. 7 -are most
common in engagements with individual clients and in engagements that
require complex, niche work. What do individuals and those with esoteric
legal needs have in common? They are all relatively unfamiliar with the work
of the lawyers they hire, which makes it difficult to interpret the hourly bills
that such lawyers produce. Moreover, because these clients are less likely to
offer repeat business, they have less leverage to keep lawyers in line using the
information they obtain from hourly bills. Because these individual clients
cannot exploit the key monitoring function of the billable hour, they turn to
alternative fee arrangements.
The monitoring theory of billable hours has significant practical
implications. It suggests that if in-house legal departments become larger and
more sophisticated, they might utilize billable hours more than ever before.
This contradicts the standard prediction that more efficient, modem in-house
counsel will no longer need the billable hour.8
Above all, this Article argues that the billable hour serves a legitimate
function that almost all of its skeptics have overlooked. Far from being a
bugaboo that distorts incentives and enslaves associates, the billable hour will
be the appropriate compensation structure for a wide swath of clients and
firms. Critics of the billable hour should acknowledge its uses as well as its
abuses.
II.

MONITORING AND AGENCY THEORY

We should begin by dispelling the idea that the hourly bill is a fait
accompli, paid by clients without question. The reality is more complex-an
itemized hourly bill conveys crucial information about the lawyer's efforts
and provides a medium for the client to direct those efforts. This is especially
important when firms have repeat interactions with clients, because repeat
clients will have greater leverage to push back against bills that they find
unreasonable.
Consider the client-firm interaction under ideal conditions for
monitoring, where an expert in-house attorney routinely contracts with an
outside law firm for legal services. The in-house attomey typically has
experience working at a law firm, 9 meaning that she understands both sides

7.
This Article uses "billable hours," "fixed fees," and "contingent fees" as synecdoche
for the fee agreements that utilize them.
8.
See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 4, at 770.
9.
See In-house Counsel, CHAMBERS
ASSOCIATES,
http://www.chambersassociate.com/where-to-start/alternative-careers/in-house-counsel (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).

Published by Scholar Commons,

3

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 2 [], Art. 4
300

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 70: 297

of the transaction and is aware of the potential abuses of hourly billing.
Moreover, she knows the extent of her legal needs before approaching outside
counsel in the first place. Critics sometimes assume the in-house attorney to
be powerless in the face of avaricious firm lawyers but this view vastly
understates the sophistication of the modem corporate legal department. The
firm and the corporation often have a robust existing relationship that the law
firm has worked hard to cultivate. The threat that the client will withdraw
future business if the lawyer abuses the hourly billing system gives the client
considerable leverage. o
The hourly bill conveys two main pieces of information to the in-house
counsel. It tells her the outside lawyer's hourly rate, and it tells her how the
outside firm has spent its time on a matter. The in-house counsel will have an
idea of how much time a matter should take, particularly if it is a routine issue
and if she has contracted similar work to the law firm before. As a result, she
knows what range of charges is reasonable; often, she will specify a ceiling
on the number of hours that a law firm may spend on a matter or require that
the firm seek authorization before exceeding a certain spend. If she finds the
fees unreasonable, she can dispute them. Finally, if she feels the firm has
failed to work efficiently, she can simply refuse to hire it again on future
matters.
Particularly in the modem, highly competitive legal market, corporate
clients do not hesitate to use all of the above tactics in order to extract the best
deals from law firms. For example, law firms are frequently forced to "write
down" their final bills when clients complain that the bills are unjustifiably
high anticipating this, many firm partners will also "write off' the hours of
their associates even before submitting a bill to a client." In-house counsel
can effectively enforce discipline on its outside counsel by virtue of their

10. One might wonder why this should be so if contracts with outside counsel are
executed at market-clearing rates. One answer is that they are not, and that law firms are paid
"efficiency wages" to give them an incentive to do good work and to maintain reputations for
efficiency. See generally EFFICIENCY WAGE MODELS OF THE LABOR MARKET (George A.
Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen eds., 1986) [hereinafter Akerlof & Yellen] (exploring efficiency wage
models as a means to understanding fluctuations in the labor market). Another answer is that
there are fixed costs of acquiring a client relationship, and the profit of corporate work will
generally be on repeat business rather than the first matter a law firm works on. Thus, the client
will have power over the law firm analogous to that in a hold-up problem because the law firm
has already made considerable investments in the client relationship. See generally Faruk Gul,
Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem, 69 ECONOMETRICA 343, 344 (2001)
(outlining the tendency of businesses to invest efficiently creating an interaction between
unobservable investment and dynamic bargaining).
11. See David J. Bilinsky & Laura A. Calloway, It's Sink-or-Swim Time: Leakage
Reports, A.B.A.: L. PRAC., July-Aug. 2005, at 51, 51.
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repeat relationship and the value of the corporation's business.1 2 Therefore,
we should discard any cartoonish vision of an impotent corporate counsel
simply yielding to billing abuses by law firms. In-house attorneys actively
glean information from hourly bills and use that information to direct the
conduct of outside counsel.
We can clarify this point through the lens of agency theory. Agency
theory is the study of the relationship between principals (here, clients) and
agents (here, lawyers). The principal must trust the agent to represent its
interests in the absence of perfect information. However, we assume the agent
to be self-interested; thus, the dominant tension in agency theory is the
difficulty in encouraging the agent to act as altruistically as possible without
imposing unduly burdensome constraints on either party.13
In this framework, monitoring is one example of an "agency cost"-a cost
of aligning principal and agent incentives or failing to do so. The traditional
definition of agency costs is: "the sum of: (1) the monitoring expenditures by
the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by the agent, [and] (3) the residual
loss." 14
Bonding expenditures are expenditures to promote agent loyalty for
example, forgone opportunities when the agent signs a non-compete contract.
The residual loss is the cost imposed on the principal when the agent fails to
serve the principal's interests-for example, the cost of lost productivity when
an employee shirks at work.'" And most important to my theory is monitoring,
which "includes more than just measuring or observing the behavior of the
agent. It includes efforts on the part of the principal to 'control' the behavior
of the agent through budget restrictions, compensation policies, operating
rules[,] etc." 16
It is important to recognize that we cannot entirely eliminate agency
costs we could attempt to reduce residual loss by undertaking costly
bonding, for example, or we could accept some amount of residual loss in
order to avoid the costs of monitoring, but each case involves a tradeoff

12. Note, however, that clients are not necessarily all corporations. Private equity firms,
for example, are highly valued clients with considerable leverage because they bring so much
repeat business. David Lat, When $1,000 an Hour Is Not Enough, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct.
3, 2007, 7:12 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2007/10/03/when-1000-an-hour-is-notenough.
13. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 405-06 (6th ed.
2016).
14. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (footnote
omitted).
15. See id.
16. Id. at 308 n.9.
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between two competing values. The central problem of agency theory is to
minimize overall agency costs. Monitoring is merely a reasonably inexpensive
means to reduce agent misconduct in the context of law firm billing.
To see why, consider the two most popular alternatives to the billable
hour: the fixed fee and the contingent fee. The fixed fee is a flat amount
negotiated up front, to be paid regardless of the time the lawyer spends on the
matter and regardless of the outcome.' 7 On the other hand, the contingent fee
(sometimes called a "success fee")" is paid as a function of positive client
outcomes-for example, as a percentage of a plaintiffs recovery at trial.' 9
Each method brings an idiosyncratic mix of incentive based tradeoffs. Many
commentators miss this point, criticizing billable hours for their incentive
effects without acknowledging the fundamental impossibility of costlessly
aligning lawyer and client objectives. 20
Fixed fees, for instance, encourage efficiency but discourage effort. In
that respect, they are the inverse of hourly fees because flat-fee lawyers do
not benefit when their clients obtain better outcomes, such lawyers will tend
to shirk additional work because such work marginally benefits their clients
but not themselves. The degree of their shirking may be limited by their desire
to maintain good reputations, by honesty, and by professional pride but all
of these factors should prevent the abuse of billable hours as well, and we
know from experience that incentives will always influence practitioners on
the margins. Just as billable hours might encourage a litigation team to extend
a trial in order to pad its fees, a fixed fee arrangement might encourage a
litigation team to settle early in order to avoid additional, uncompensated
work. Both approaches present hazards in opposing directions. 2 1

17. FixedFee, 1 BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 1066 (Desk ed. 2010). For a survey of these
different billing methodologies, see generally Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer
Behavior in Litigation: What Does the EmpiricalLiteratureReally Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943,
1944 (2002) (explaining how lawyer fees are computed).
18. See Ass'N CORP. COUNSEL & CROWELL & MORING LLP, GUIDE TO VALUE-BASED
BILLING 14 (2012) [hereinafter ASS'N CORP. COUNSEL].

19. 1 BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 17, at 1063.
20. See, e.g., Evan R. Chesler, Kill the Billable Hour, FORBES (Dec. 25, 2008, 10:20 am),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/0112/026.html#779dddl 36697; Sam Glover, Pro/Con: FlatFees,
LAWYERIST (Aug. 30, 2012), http://1awyerist.com/47453/procon-flat-fees.
21. Note that what may be inefficient for clients may be socially efficient, insofar as
litigation imposes negative externalities on opposing counsel who generally must process and
respond to every legal action undertaken by the other side and the legal system which will
provide court time, judge expertise, etc. without being reimbursed for the full extent of trial
costs. Thus, as a social policy, we might think it a good thing to encourage lawyers to shirk by
settling early, but such a discussion exceeds the scope of this Article. See generally Steven
Shavell, The FundamentalDivergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the
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Contingent fees might initially seem like an ideal method to align the
interests of lawyers and clients-after all, the lawyer will be paid only if her
client wins. But upon closer consideration, contingent fees still create
significant moral hazards. Consider a case where a lawyer will receive one
third of the plaintiffs winnings at trial. The lawyer has an opportunity to
negotiate an early settlement; she could pursue a more favorable one, but she
estimates it would take fifty additional hours to do so, in which time she could
instead earn $10,000 by pursuing another case. The estimated gain to the client
from further work is $24,000, meaning that the estimated gain to the attorney
is only $8,000. Based on these facts, a purely self-interested lawyer will
choose the easy settlement, to the detriment of her client. 22 So, like the fixed
fee, the contingent fee also encourages shirking because the lawyer must bear
all marginal costs of her labor while receiving only part of the benefits. 23
Contingent fees provide more of an incentive for attorney effort than fixed fee
arrangements, but not as much as the hourly fee. Consequently, they generally
align principal-agent incentives better than flat fees. On the other hand,
contingent fees are also more complex to negotiate, easier for the agent to
manipulate because of their complexity, and more costly in terms of their
enforcement.24
Finally, billable hours encourage thoroughness but discourage efficiency.
In general, lawyers billing by the hour will try to overestimate the extent of
legal work and complete matters as slowly as possible. In terms of agency
costs, the billable hour system incurs residual losses when the marginal cost

Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 575-76 (1997) (discussing the expensive nature of the
legal system as a social institution being too costly and socially inappropriate).
22. The lawyer's expected marginal gain from the settlement is $8,000, which is less than
the $10,000 she could make elsewhere.
23. The only way that a lawyer would not have an incentive to shirk would be for her to
receive 100% of the gains, perhaps by buying the client's litigation interest in its entirety.
However, the sale of litigation rights is uncommon and of questionable legality. See Binyamin
Appelbaum, Investors Put Money on Lawsuits to Get Payouts, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/15/business/15lawsuit.html; see generally Winand Emons,
Expertise, ContingentFees, andInsufficient Attorney Effort, 20 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 21, 2123 (2000) (providing a discussion on the theories supporting hourly fees being economically
efficient).
24. In the context of litigation, a lawyer could theoretically fully align her incentives with
a plaintiff if the lawyer were to purchase 100% of the legal claim from the plaintiff However,
litigation finance arrangements of this sort are not generally pursued in the United States-law
firms typically lack the liquidity to fimd such arrangements, which are typically driven by third
parties such as hedge fimds, and anti-champerty rules prohibit the assignment of lawsuit claims
in many jurisdictions. See Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a
ProceduralProblem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65, 95-96 (2010); Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim,
64 VAND. L. REv. 61, 70 (2011); Joanna M. Shepherd, Ideal Versus Reality in Third-Party
Litigation Financing,8 J.L. ECON & POL'Y 593, 594-95 (2012).
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of an additional hour exceeds the marginal benefit to the client. In contrast,
the residual loss of fixed and contingent fees is suboptimal effort exerted by
the lawyer. These residual costs are different in kind rather than degree, which
makes comparison between them difficult but not impossible. A key
difference between excessive billing and suboptimal effort is that monitoring
can remedy the former but not the latter. Using the information provided in an
hourly bill, clients can effectively reduce their residual loss for inefficient
work. This is because a lawyer's hourly bill must explicitly state the amount
and nature of the work undertaken. The lawyer cannot manipulate these
statements without committing outright fraud and even then, an expert inhouse client can often tell when hours have been inflated. 25 In contrast, the
quality of legal work is difficult for the client to discern. Legal work is to a
large extent a "credence good" 26-its quality will only become apparent long
after it has been paid for, if ever. For example, a plaintiff might never know
that a flat-fee lawyer could have obtained a larger recovery through trial than
through early settlement. In transactional work, even an expert client might
not discover an error in due diligence until long after a deal has closed. Thus,
clients are unable to monitor the quality of legal services, making it difficult
to mitigate the residual losses of fixed fees.
As a monitoring tool, the billable hour is not very costly in fact, many
law firms informally tracked hours even prior to the rise of the billable hour
in the 1970s, 27 and firms that do not bill by the hour often require lawyers to

internally report hours even on matters that are billed using alternative fees. 28
So, the marginal agency cost of the billable hour is relatively small, and for
the right client, it can avoid both the incentive problems of alternative fees
and the potential for agent inefficiency.
In fact, clients paying hourly fees will benefit from monitoring even
before an engagement has begun. Just as they must monitor lawyers during
the engagement to prevent opportunistic overwork, they must also monitor
lawyers prior to the start of the engagement to avoid opportunistic
recommendations of unprofitable work.

25. At the very least, the client should be able to tell when one firm has inflated its hours
out of proportion with other firms. It is reasonable to think that the market for outside legal work
is subject to a certain amount of "puffery," whereby all firms will systematically overstate their
hours by a certain amount. Clients can counter this by negotiating for lower hourly rates in
anticipation of the puffery, or they can just accept puffery as a component of an efficiency wage,
Akerlof & Yellen, supra note 10, at 106.
26. The term was first introduced by Michael R. Darby and Edi Karni in their seminal
paper, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount ofFraud, 16 J.L. & EcON. 67, 81 (1973).
27. See Jones & Glover, supra note 4, at 294.
28. Wachtell Lipton is one example. See infra Section III.A.
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For example, imagine that a plaintiff is deciding whether to pursue a
lawsuit with an expected recovery of $1,500. Lawsuits of this type are either
high-effort, with expected legal fees of $3,000, or low-effort, with expected
fees of $1,000, with a 50% probability of the lawsuit falling into either
category. Expert clients (those capable of monitoring) know whether the case
is high-effort or low-effort, but non-expert clients do not know. Lawyers can
perceive whether a case is high-effort or low-effort, but they do not share this
information with the client, creating an information asymmetry.29
Even assuming that lawyers do not bill more hours than necessary, a nonexpert client in this hypothetical ought not to pay on an hourly basis. This is
because the lawyer will opportunistically accept any case on an hourly basis,
even if the case is unprofitable for the client. As a result, the expected cost to
sue will be $2,000 (the average of $1,000 for the low-labor matter and $3,000
for the high-labor matter), which is greater than the expected recovery.
However, if the client solicits lawyers to take the case on a fixed fee basis for
$1,000, then lawyers will only take the lawsuit if they determine it to be a loweffort lawsuit, and the client will have an expected profit of $500 (the $1,500
recovery minus $1,000 in fixed fees). Therefore, the non-expert client will
prefer fixed fees in order to force lawyers to differentiate between low- and
high-effort cases. This result is a form of bonding-aligning the lawyer's
incentive to select low-effort cases with the client's interest in not pursuing
high-effort cases. However, the expert client need not bond because it can
monitor the lawyer's recommendations-it can select the low-effort cases and
only pursue those. The expert client is therefore indifferent between hourly
and fixed fees on the basis of case selection-it will instead select fee
arrangements on some other basis, perhaps to avoid the agency costs of
credence goods, as discussed above.
None of this is to say that monitoring is the only way to minimize agency
costs. Clients might instead opt for bonding rather than monitoring-for
example, by relying on firm reputation as a guarantee of work quality. 30 Or a
client could simply tolerate residual losses as less costly than attempts to bond
or monitor.

29. This hypothetical is a variant on one offered by James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn E.
Spier, Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney
Compensation, 9 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 349, 352-53 (1993).
30. Professional reputations are costly to build and maintain because they require
practitioners to accrue reputational capital and to ensure that their own agents (partners and
associates at the same firm) do not erode that capital. For a fuller description of the theory of
reputational bonding, see Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm
Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1714-20 (1998).
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Given the choice between these strategies, we might wonder what set of
tradeoffs help lawyers and clients to select the appropriate billing method. The
answer will be useful in two respects: it will help us to understand the
advantages and disadvantages of each approach, and it will help us to predict
shifts in which firms use which methods. All the methods discussed are used
by at least some lawyers in the status quo, although hourly billing
predominates. What considerations prevent firms on the margins from
adopting hourly billing, and what considerations have led the billable hour to
its place of pride in the legal profession?
A.

The Risk-Incentives Tradeoff

One popular school of thought in agency theory argues that the
equilibrium is determined by the tradeoff between risk appetite and
incentives. 31 According to this school, the principal is generally better
positioned to bear risk, but the agent must also bear some of the risk so that
the agent is incentivized to do good work. 32 In the words of one leading article
attempting to explain the prevalence of hourly billing:
Our model suggests that the optimal contract will be
influenced by a balancing of two concerns: efficient risk
distribution and limiting "moral hazard"-the moral hazard
is the danger that a fixed-fee contract will induce the lawyer
to conduct too little work and that an hourly contract will
induce excess work. Economic forces will encourage the
client and lawyer to choose the contract type that offers the
lowest sum of risk costs and costs from moral hazard.33

31. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent
Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55, 55-56 (1979).
32. See Pauline T. Kim, Beyond Principal-Agent Theories: Law and the Judicial
Hierarchy, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 535, 546-47 (2011).
33. George B. Shepherd & Morgan Cloud, Time andMoney: Discovery Leads to Hourly
Billing, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 91, 95 (1999). See also RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 534 (3d ed. 1986); Robert Gibbons, Incentives in Organizations, 12 J. ECON. PERSP.
115, 116-17 (1998); Joseph G. Haubrich, Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the PrincipalAgent Problem, 102 J. POL. ECON. 258, 259-62 (1994) (creating a model of CEO compensation
in which the primary competing forces are the agent's risk aversion and the desire of the
corporation to provide optimal incentives); Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Aggregation and
Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives, 55 ECONOMETRICA 303, 305 (1987);
Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice, 47
DEPAUL L. REV. 267 (1998).
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Using a real-world example, suppose that a construction firm wishes to
incentivize its employees to work diligently, without having to constantly
monitor their performance. One way that it might do so is to link
compensation to output for example, it could pay its welders ten cents for
each rivet they weld. But what if the rate at which welders work depended on
factors outside their control? What if, for example, welders worked only half
as quickly on a cold day or only a quarter as quickly in the rain? The welders
might be uncomfortable having their pay fluctuate by a factor of eight based
on random environmental variables. So, in order to attract risk-averse welders
to do the same work for uncertain compensation, the construction firm would
have to pay a riskpremium.
The risk premium is an additional amount of money required to
compensate employees for taking on risk. Imagine a welder who is indifferent
between a risk-free salary of $X and a risky perhaps output-based salary
of $Y. If the welder is risk averse, Y will be greater than X. The risk premium
is thus $Y - $X, quantifying the cost of risk to the welder. A core premise of
the risk-incentives model is that the risk premium will generally be greater for
the employee than for the employer because the employer has more financial
reserves to smooth the impact of output volatility. (In real-world terms, a large
construction firm could probably weather a few weeks or even months of
delays, but many welders would immediately suffer if their pay were reduced
for even a week.) Because the risk premium is greater for the employee, the
conventional Coasean move is to assign the risk to the lowest-cost bearer.34
To do otherwise incurs an efficiency cost, determined by subtracting the
employer's risk premium from the employee's risk premium. This cost must
be weighed against the efficiency gain from aligning principal and agent
incentives through compensation.
So, under the risk-incentives model, the construction firm will only
attempt to match employee compensation to output until the marginal benefit
from doing so equals the marginal risk premium it must pay its workers. Thus,
it might institute an hourly wage accompanied by a bonus at the end of the

34.

The idea that the law should assign risks to their lowest-cost bearer was famously

spearheaded by Guido Calabresi. See generally GuIDo CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS:
A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970) (discussing accident costs and how to effectively

reduce them); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499, 500 (1961) (examining the theoretical justifications of different methods of
distributing losses). Calabresi built on Ronald Coase's massively influential 1960 paper, The
Problem ofSocial Cost. Coase argued that, absent transaction costs, parties should bargain over
the assignment of rights in order to efficiently satisfy mutual interests. See R.H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. I passim (1960). For example, absent other incentive
problems, the welder should be willing to take a lower salary in order to avoid having to bear
the risk of salary fluctuations, and the construction firm should take the deal.
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project based on the number of rivets the welders have completed. The
classical example of blended incentive pay and flat pay is the compensation
of white-collar employees, who are often paid a combination of a guaranteed
salary and a contingent bonus. The idea that compensation packages respond
to risk tolerance jives with our anecdotal experience with corporations, where
non-executive employees who one expects to have lower risk tolerances
because their total wealth will generally be lower-are mostly paid fixed
salaries; in contrast, highly paid executives, who should be better positioned
to tolerate swings in compensation, are generally paid a higher percentage of
their compensation in the form of incentive pay. 3
One might analogize that the law firm is like the welder or the CEO: the
client wants to incentivize the lawyers' performance, but the lawyers (true to
type, risk averse) want to place the risk of cost overruns on the client.
Consequently, the optimal employment contract will depend on the relative
risk tolerances of each party the greater the relative risk aversion of the law
firm, the more likely it is that the law firm will demand an hourly fee (or
demand a large risk premium to use fixed fees). The greater the risk aversion
of the client, the more likely that the client will demand to pay a fixed fee (or
the higher the risk premium the client will be willing to pay). If the client's
and law firm's risk tolerances are equal, they should be collectively indifferent
between different fee arrangements, so long as the party bearing the risk is
properly compensated.
This story appeals to legal scholars, who are familiar with the conceptual
framework that one ought to assign risk to its lowest cost bearer.36 It provides
a theoretically appealing equilibrium that could potentially explain otherwise
puzzling real-world variation in billing structures. Most importantly, it
comports with the lived experience of lawyers-one major objection from
practitioners considering the shift toward alternative fees is that they are
uncomfortable taking on the risk that a matter will be more expensive than
initially budgeted. 37

35. There are other explanations, of course: low-level employees are unlikely to affect
overall corporate performance, so performance pay may simply be less effective for them than
for top executives. A more nuanced modern account suggests that stock options for nonexecutives may encourage performance by encouraging workers to monitor the performance of
their peers and to enforce group anti-shirking norms. See Yael V. Hochberg & Laura Lindsey,
Incentives, Targeting and Firm Performance: An Analysis ofNon-Executive Stock Options, 23
REV. FIN. STUD. 4148, 4174-75 (2010).
36. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Pete Roberts, Alternative Fee Arrangements: Are They Right for Your
Practice?,DENOVO, Dec. 2011, at 18; Rachel M. Zahorsky, Facingthe Alternative: How Does
a Flat Fee System Really Work?, 98 A.B.A. J., Mar. 2012, at 40; ASS'N CORP. COUNSEL, supra
note 18passim.
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However, the risk-incentives model clearly conflicts with the monitoring
model. The risk-incentives tradeoff suggests that as parties become less risk
averse-as one would expect because law firms and corporations have
become substantially larger over the past forty years 38 -that the incentives
side will dominate and that output-linked pay (like success fees) will become
more common. On the other hand, the monitoring model suggests that as
parties become larger and more sophisticated, they will better be able to use
hourly fees as a monitoring tool, and as a result, hourly fees will become more
common. To resolve this conflict, let us now turn to evidence from practice.
III. BILLABLE HOURS IN PRACTICE

A.

Today

The risk-incentives model produces conveniently testable predictions. If
workers resist incentive pay because they are risk averse, then it follows that
workers in fields with more volatile production functions should resist
incentive pay more, and therefore, incentive pay should be the most common
in fields where outcomes are least volatile. In fact, the opposite is true. As
economist Canice Prendergast discovered in a broad survey of different
industries (including sharecroppers, franchisees, and natural gas contractors),
there is generally a robust positive relationship between the level of risk
attaching to a project and the likelihood that the contractors will use incentive
pay. 39

In the context of law firms, the risk-incentives model suggests that the
form of compensation should be determined by the relative risk tolerances of
the principal (client) and agent (law firm). Large law firms will generally be
better able to bear the risk of cost overruns (therefore favoring fixed fees), as
well as the risk of outcome uncertainty (favoring contingent fees). On the
other hand, large corporate clients will similarly be better able to bear both
risks and should prefer hourly fees. Consequently, small law firms serving
large corporate clients should use hourly fees, whereas large law firms serving
individual clients should use fixed or contingent fees.
Contrary to the predictions of the risk-incentives model, however, the
vanguard of the alternative fee movement has been small, boutique law firms
engaged in niche work. These law firms often serve large corporate clients

38. See generally MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 77-87 (1991) (analyzing the pattern of law firm
growth over several decades).
39. See Canice Prendergast, The Tenuous Trade-OffBetween Risk and Incentives, 110 J.
POL. ECON. 1071, 1077-79 (2002).
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who are better able to bear the risk of overruns than the law firm. If riskbearing is the motivation for alternative fees, it makes little sense that the early
adopters of alternative fees are exactly those firms worst positioned to bear
risk.
Consider Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, a relatively small New York
law firm. Wachtell is one of the most profitable law firms in the United
States 40 but has only a single office and 272 lawyers, 4 1 many fewer than its
competitors. 42 Wachtell initially built its reputation on its expertise in mergers
and acquisitions, which are often one-off engagements with very large,
publicly traded companies. Companies in mergers and acquisitions expect to
incur significant transaction costs related to the deal, and they are not
particularly sensitive to the risk of overruns. Thus, Wachtell is a good example
of a relatively small firm that typically does work for large clients that are
better positioned to bear risk. The risk-incentives model predicts that
Wachtell will be more likely to use the billable hour than its competitors.
In fact, however, Wachtell is widely known for its alternative billing
practices-it typically uses something akin to the success fee, taking its fee as
a percentage of the size of the deal, much like an investment bank. 43 This
arrangement, which places all of the risk of overruns or failed deals on
Wachtell, has proven immensely profitable yet Wachtell is still the only firm
among its peers to primarily use this method.
Another example is the boutique litigation firm of Bartlit Beck Herman
Palenchar & Scott LLP. Bartlit Beck is a Chicago- and Denver-based boutique
litigation firm with just 83 lawyers, 44 which has vocally been at the forefront

40. See Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz Firm Profile, LAW.COM, https://www.law.
com/law-firm-profile?id=318&name=Wachtell-Lipton-Rosen-Katz (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).
41. See Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz Firm Profile, CHAMBERS & PARTNERS, https://
www.chambersandpartners.com/Global/firm/4210/wachtell-lipton-rosen-katz (last visited Oct.

30, 2018).

&

&

42. For example, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom employs approximately 1,700
lawyers across twenty-two offices. See, e.g., Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP
Affiliates
Firm
Profile,
CHAMBERS
&
PARTNERS,
https://www.chambers
(last visited Oct.
andpartners.com/USA/firm/3656/skadden-arps-slate-meagher-flom-affiliates
30, 2018). Davis Polk & Wardwell employs 1,054 lawyers across ten offices. See Davis Polk
Wardwell
LLP
Firm
Profile,
CHAMBERS
&
PARTNERS,
https://www.chambersandpartners.com/USA/firm/3833/davis-polk-wardwell
(last visited Oct.
30, 2018). Finally, Sullivan & Cromwell employs 888 lawyers across thirteen offices. See
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP Firm Profile, CHAMBERS & PARTNERS, https://www.
chambersandpartners.com/USA/firm/3663/sullivan-cromwell (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).
43. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Coming ofAge in a CorporateLaw Firm:
The Economics ofAssociate CareerPatterns, 41 STAN. L. REv. 567, 585 n.50 (1989).
44. Our Lawyers, BARTLIT BECK LLP, http://www.bartlit-beck.com/lawyers.html (last

visited Nov. 19, 2018).
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of the alternative billing movement.45 Bartlit Beck refuses to bill by the hour,
employing instead a combination of flat fees and contingent fees. 46 Yet, its
typical clients are some of the largest companies in America, including Tyco,
Amazon.com, and Hewlett-Packard. 47 Surely these clients ought to bear the
risk of trial uncertainty rather than placing it on a small boutique law firm?
The story becomes even more convincing when we consider that
Wachtell, Bartlit Beck, and many of the other firms most enthusiastic about
alternative billing are similar to some of their peer firms along virtually every
axis except for size. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, for example, was
founded around roughly the same time as Wachtell 48 by a culturally similar
group of partners specializing in the same sort of work. 49 The major
distinction between these two firms is that Wachtell stayed relatively small,50
while Skadden expanded into new locations, bigger offices, and new practice
areas, such that it is now one of the largest law firms in the world and one of
the largest private companies in the United States." Yet, Skadden relies
almost exclusively on billable hours. Similarly, Bartlit Beck regularly litigates
with and against law firms with much larger litigation practices, both on the
plaintiff and defense side52 but these competitors almost always bill by the
hour.
In fact, the commonality between the best-known alternative billing firms
seems not to be size, but specialization. These firms almost always have a
particular specialty merger and acquisition work at Wachtell, trial practice
at Bartlit Beck. Certain other firms implementing alternative billing practices
have been larger than Wachtell or Bartlit Beck, but these firms have still

45. JIM HASSETT & MATT HASSETT, LEGALBIzDEV, LEGAL PRICING IN TRANSITION:
How CLIENT DEMANDS AND ALTERNATIVE FEES ARE CHANGING THE WAY THAT LAW FIRMS
PRICE THEIR SERVICES 15 (2012).
46. Success Based Fees, BARTLIT BECK HERMAN PALENCHAR & SCOTT LLP,
http://www.bartlit-beck.com/about-success.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2018).
47.

See

In

the News,

BARTLIT

BECK HERMAN

PALENCHAR

&

SCOTT

LLP,

http://www.bartlit-beck.com/about-news.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2018).
48. The
Firm, SKADDEN,
ARPS,
SLATE,
MEAGHER
& FLOM
LLP,
https://www.skadden.com/about/overview (last visited Aug. 23, 2018). Wachtell was founded
in 1965. About the Firm, WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, http://www.wlrk.com/Firm/ (last
visited Oct. 30, 2018).
49.

See MALCOLM GLADWELL, OUTLIERS: THE STORY OF SUCCESS 116-60 (2008); Eli

Wald, The Rise and Fall of the WASP and Jewish Law Firms, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1803, 1832
n.133 (2008).
50. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 43, at 585; see also supra note 42 and
accompanying text.
5 1. See Skadden on the Forbes America's Largest Private Companies List, FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/companies/skadden-arps (last updated Oct. 24, 2018).
52. See In the News, supra note 47.

Published by Scholar Commons,

15

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 2 [], Art. 4
312

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 70: 297

tended to practice a particular specialty. Fish & Richardson P.C., for example,
an intellectual property boutique with twelve offices and over 350 attorneys, 53
is often cited along with Bartlit Beck and Wachtell as a billing innovator. 54
Both Fish & Richardson and Wachtell count among the hundred largest law
firms in America by revenue.5 5 So, it appears that size alone is not
determinative of propensity for alternative billing. Instead, there seems to be
something about specialization that encourages firms to use flat or contingent
fees.
If specialization were the only factor related to alternative fee use, we
might doubt whether monitoring was the underlying cause. After all, it could
be that boutique firms are simply more progressive in general-they might
attract attorneys more eager for experimentation, or homogeneity among the
work and interests of the firm members might allow for faster adaptation to
market changes. Or it could be that lawyers prefer to work under alternative
fee arrangements as a matter of personal preference and that only high-end
lawyers have the negotiating power to convince clients to allow them to do
so.
But even specialization fails to tell the whole story. Superstar firms like
Bartlit Beck, Wachtell, and Fish & Richardson are not the only ones to reject
hourly billing. Many plaintiffs' attorneys, whose clients are usually nonlawyer individuals, bill using contingent fees; 56 many solo practitioners use

flat fees in their dealings with non-lawyer individual clients in fields such as
family law,5 7 real estate law, 5 and estate planning. 59 The work of such solo
practitioners is relatively much less specialized and much more routine than
the work at Wachtell or Bartlit Beck.
The overall picture is therefore something like a bell-shaped graph
between specialization and use of the billable hour. At the low end, solo
practitioners provide legal services at flat rates to non-expert clients; in the

53. About Fish & Richardson, FISH & RICHARDSON, http://www.fr.com/about/ (last
visited Nov. 29, 2018).
54. See HASSETT & HASSETT, supra note 45, at 17-18; see also Alternative Fee
Arrangements, FISH & RICHARDSON, https://www.fr.com/alternative-fee-arrangements (last
visited Nov. 29, 2018).
55. The 2014 AmLaw 100: The Super Rich Get Richer, AM. LAW. (Apr. 28, 2014, 12:00
AM), http://www.law.com/americanlawyer/almID/1202724138607/The-2014-Am-Law-100-TheSuper-Rich-Get-Richer/.
56. See Contingency Fee (Contingent Fee), 1 BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY, supra note
17, at 1063.
57. See, e.g., Fee Schedule, HOLT FAMILY LAW, http://holtfamilylaw.com/id4.html (last
visited Nov. 29, 2018).
58. See, e.g., Fee Schedule, DAVID R. GREEN, ESQUIRE, http://www.attorney
davidgreen.corn/fee-schedule (last visited Nov. 29, 2018).
59. See, e.g., id.
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middle, large law firms provide repeat legal advice by the hour to large, expert
corporate clients; and at the high end, boutique law firms provide one-off,
niche services at flat rates to the same large corporate clients. So, what do
urban super-specialist lawyers and small-town generalist lawyers have in
common?
The answer depends not on the lawyers but on the clients. The elderly
grandfather seeking estate planning advice and the corporate general counsel
seeking takeover defense advice have one thing in common: they have little
capacity to monitor the work of the lawyer. The grandfather is largely
unfamiliar with the law, and therefore, unable to predict how much a matter
should cost or to complain if his lawyer returns a list of unreasonable hourly
charges. Similarly, because hostile takeovers are rare events in the life of a
company (hopefully), the general counsel will have only a rough idea of how
much it should cost or what kind of work such a legal matter requires.
Moreover, if general counsel has not worked with her outside counsel before,
she will have a more difficult time interpreting the idiosyncrasies of her
outside firm's hourly bills, and she cannot use the potential for repeat business
as a means to enforce agent discipline.
Contrast these two examples with the more conventional work of a large,
diversified law firm. Such a firm will have repeat relationships with its
corporate clients, often even working with the same in-house lawyer on a
series of different matters. In this case, in-house lawyers have the ability to
specify how much they expect the law firm to bill on each matter. The law
firm knows that the in-house lawyers will review bills and that they can move
their business elsewhere if they are dissatisfied.60

&

60. Note, however, that there are some exceptions to the general trend that specialized
firms are more likely to bill by the hour. The best known among these is the firm of Crowell
Moring LLP, a generalist Washington law firm with 482 lawyers. Crowell & Moring LLP Firm
Profile, CHAMBERS
&
PARTNERS,
http://www.chambers.com/profile/organisation/
2838?publicationTypeld=2 (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). Crowell & Moring derives a significant
portion of its revenue from alternative fees. See Value-Based Billing, CROWELL & MORING,
LLP, http://www.crowell.com/Innovation-in-Service/Value-Based-Billing (last visited Nov. 29,
2018). However, Crowell & Moring seems to have developed its approach to billing as a
response to requests from its largest clients, rather than as a proactive policy. In particular,
AT&T and DuPont have both been at the vanguard of billing reform in recent years, and both
are major Crowell & Moring clients. See Case Studies, CROWELL & MORING, LLP
https://www.crowell.com/Case-Studies (last visited Oct. 30, 2018); see also Terry Carter, Do It

the Dupont Way, 90 A.B.A. J., Apr. 2004, at 27; Kerry Curry, Five Firms Experiment with
Alternative
Fee
Arrangements,
TEX.
LAWBOOK,
Feb.
25,
2014,
at
1,
http://www.patrickonpricing.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2014_TexasLawbookFiveFi
rmsExperiment Reprint.pdf.
Why should AT&T and DuPont be so enthusiastic about alternative billing if monitoring
is the dominant explanation for billable hours? After all, AT&T and DuPont both have sprawling
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So, both as an intuitive matter and as a descriptive matter based on the
pattern of billable hours used at law firms, monitoring remains the most viable
explanation for the prevalence of the billable hour.
B.

The History of the Billable Hour

Another simple way to investigate the rationale for the billable hour is to
investigate its history. As noted earlier, the risk-incentives model predicts that
as law firms and corporations get larger, all parties will become less risk
averse, the risk premium will decrease, the incentive side of the equation will
dominate, and output-based compensation will become more common. In
contrast, the monitoring model predicts that as corporations develop larger inhouse legal departments, they will be better able to exploit the monitoring
function of the hourly fee, and hourly billing will become more common.
Again, the monitoring story prevails. The billable hour became standard
in the United States at a remarkable point in the history of legal practice-in
the 1970s, when corporate legal departments transformed from one-man back
offices to large, sophisticated miniature law firms. 6' The timing of this shift
was no coincidence. First-person accounts suggest that corporate counsel
actively demanded improved monitoring metrics, and the billable hour was
the response.
Prior to the 1970s, lawyers billed their clients primarily through a
combination of fixed fees, contingent fees, and an amorphous method known
as "value billing," 62 wherein they would simply hand the client a bill at the

legal departments and presumably possess more legal expertise and monitoring capacity than
most firms.
One answer is that AT&T and DuPont require only specialty legal services precisely
because their own legal departments are so large. Because both companies have already
internalized generalist roles to in-house counsel, they only go to firms like Crowell & Moring
for unusual work, where monitoring is relatively difficult. For example, much of the work that
Crowell & Moring does for both companies is antitrust litigation, which is a large and unusual
event in the life of a company. See Case Studies, supra. And indeed, much of the impetus for
alternative billing at Crowell & Moring seems to have come from its relatively specialized
litigation department. See generally ASS'N CORP. COUNSEL, supra note 18.
Another (less convincing) answer is that corporate legal departments obtain a kind of
prestige from being on the forefront of billable hour reform. Thus, the distribution of billable
hour reformers among general counsel might be skewed in the present because billable hours
are currently such a hot topic among lawyers and because leaders of the bar will tend to be
general counsel at the largest and most prestigious corporations.
61. See Carl D. Liggio, The ChangingRole of CorporateCounsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1201,
1203-05 (1997).
62. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What Does
the Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1943, 1944 (2002). Somewhat
confusingly, "value billing" has recently come to mean any sort of billing arrangement based on
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end of the matter for "Professional Services Rendered." 63 Few lawyers
itemized their services by the hour or established a written compensation
agreement with the client in advance. 64
This casual approach to fees reflected the attitude of genteel neglect that
pre-1970s lawyers took toward business matters. As members of a "learned
profession," lawyers had historically felt uncomfortable haggling with their
clients, like mere tradesmen and contractors. They considered themselves
advocates and advisors, and as such, just as trustworthy when it came to fee
calculation as when they undertook sensitive legal work for their clients.
Indeed, many lawyers considered it "unprofessional" to discuss legal fees at
all. 65

Professional pride alone was little protection against billing abuses.
However, prior to the explosive growth of in-house legal departments in the
1970s,

66

corporate clients had little capacity to monitor the efforts or the

charges of their outside contractors even if they had wanted to. The omertAl of
the legal bill complemented the nature of the corporate client.
This changed once corporations became more serious and systematic in
their selection of outside counsel. First came the transformation of the general
counsel's role itself. Prior to the 1970s, the platonic ideal of the in-house
lawyer was the "lawyer-statesman," who provided ethical advice and acted as
the conscience of the corporation. 67 But in the 1970s, the general counsel
suddenly metamorphosed from bookish consigliore to businessman in hiS 68
own right. Legal departments became larger as corporations themselves grew,
and they took on greater relative importance in corporations as regulations

the perceived value of services to the client but not necessarily based on an ex post assessment.
See Ass'N CORP. COUNSEL, supra note 18, at 17. This Article uses "value billing" exclusively
to refer to ex post billing by law firms.
63. Ezra Tom Clark, Jr., Getting Out of the Hourly Rate Quagmire-Other Billing
Alternatives, in BEYOND THE BILLABLE HOUR: AN ANTHOLOGY OF ALTERNATIVE BILLING
METHODS 183, 183 (Richard C. Reed ed., 1989); Robert E. Hirshon, Law andthe Billable Hour,
88 A.B.A. J., Feb. 2002, at 10; see also Donald S. Akins, Client Acceptance ofAlternate Pricing,
in BEYOND THE BILLABLE HOUR, supra, at 189 ("Few, if any, records were kept to determine
the cost of a particular service but no one seemed to care.").
64. Clark, supra note 63, at 183. Very few firms charge on a value basis today, but there
are some outliers-most famously the firm of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. David Lat, When
$1,000 an Hour Is Not Enough, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 3, 2007, 7:12 AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2007/10/03/when-i 000-an-hour-is-not-enough.
65. Clark, supra note 63, at 183; see also Akins, supra note 63, at 189.
66. See John P. Lynch III, The Growth ofIn-House Counsel, 65 A.B.A. J., Sept. 1979, at
1403, 1403.
67. The "lawyer-statesman" is an ideal popularized by Anthony Kronman in his book,
The Lost Lawyer. See ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 12 passim (1995).
68. At this point, the general counsel was almost always a "he."
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became more complex and profuse. 69 In-house lawyers increasingly behaved
like businesspeople and increasingly became businesspeople, often crossing
from chief legal officer to chief executive officer.
Unsurprisingly, the lawyer-businessman was much less likely than the
lawyer-statesman to tolerate the genteel anti-competitiveness of value billing.
In the 1960s and 1970s, general counsel became increasingly occupied with
what Anthony Kronman calls the "scientization of law," which emphasized
efficiency and evidence-based rational decision making over the intuitive
judgments of the lawyer-statesman. 70 General counsel began to demand
oversight over the fees that they were charged by their lawyers; moreover,
they wanted metrics with which they could compare the quality and cost of
work between different firms. The billable hour served all these purposes.
Clients had long complained about the opacity of value billing, but it was
only in the 1970s that they gained enough expertise and leverage to do
anything about it. Former ABA President Robert Hirshon recalls that as
corporate counsel gained in expertise, they began to demand "a tangible,
objective instrument for collecting fees," leading to a "cost-conscious revolt"
against value billing. 7 ' Mary Ann Altman, founder of the legal consulting firm
Altman Weil, recounts that "[h]ourly time billing was well received quickly
by clients because by using it their bills were based on something tangible that
they could understand rather than on a 'value of services' concept." 72 So, the
timing of the shift to billable hours was more than a mere coincidence-clients
embraced it in order to monitor lawyers' efforts more closely.
Meanwhile, non-expert clients-especially individuals who rarely
required legal assistance, like those attempting to draft wills or navigate the
unfamiliar territory of family law never stopped using fixed fees. As
discussed in Section II.A, supra, flat fee schedules are still very common
among solo practitioners doing routine work. For non-expert clients, the
hourly bill was just another method of payment, and an unintuitive and
unfamiliar one at that. Similarly, a few highly specialized law firms never
made the switch over to billable hours. Wachtell, for example, was founded
in 1965 and has always used a quasi-success fee based on the size of the deal. 73
Its clients would have seen little point in any other system its work was

69. Lynch, supra note 66, at 1404.
70. See KRONMAN, supra note 67, at 200-01. The idea of scientization of law was
originally conceived by Mirjan R. Damagka in his seminal analysis of the history of evidence
law. See MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 33passim (1997).
71. Hirshon, supra note 63, at 10.
72. Mary Ann Altman, A Perspective From Value Billing to Time Billing and Back to
Value Billing, in BEYOND THE BILLABLE HOUR, supra note 63, at 11.
73. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 43, at 585 n.50; The Firm, supra note 48.
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highly specialized and difficult to monitor, and its incentive to perform
cheaply was small given the low probability of repeat business.
So again, the history of the billable hour supports the monitoring
narrative. Hourly bills became the norm exactly when clients acquired the
skills necessary to interpret them. Contemporaneous accounts and the pattern
of transition confirm that the motivation for the shift was client demand for
tangible metrics of lawyer effort.
IV. CONCLUSION

Taken as a whole, the weight of historical evidence and contemporary
practice points toward the monitoring model as the more accurate explanation
for the prevalence of billable hours. Descriptive correctness aside, this model
has important practical, predictive, and prudential implications for the future
of law firm practice.
First, as discussed at length above, the model suggests that firms should
prefer alternative fee arrangements for complex matters and hourly fees for
simple ones. Certain alternative fee advocates have so far suggested the
opposite. For example, the Association of Corporate Counsel advises that
"[f]ixed fees work best for litigation matters that both the client and law firm
are already familiar with, which involve common issues and a common life
cycle, reducing variability in litigation costs." 74 This perspective focuses on

the risk of cost overruns to the law firm, and therefore, reflects the riskincentives model. In contrast, the monitoring model implies that fixed fees
work worst for routine matters, implying that firms and clients should reserve
fixed fees for complex matters.75
Second, the model predicts that if clients become more sophisticated, they
will prefer the billable hour even more strongly. Some commentators have
opined that the growth of in-house legal departments will cause a decline in
the use of billable hours. 76 The monitoring model suggests the opposite: all
else equal, increased client expertise should result-and has resulted in
wider use of the billable hour.
In reality, of course, all else is rarely equal. In-house legal departments
might grow by "insourcing" the generalist functions that they currently

74. Ass'N CORP. COUNSEL, supra note 18, at 3.
75. Of course, the fact that specialized law firms are more likely to use alternative fees
does not prove that they should use alternative fees. This Article only claims that most critics do
not recognize the monitoring function of billable hours at all. Because the best alternative to the
monitoring model is the risk-incentives model, this Article proposes many commentators vastly
overestimate the importance of risk in their policy suggestions.
76. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 4, at 770.
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outsource to law firms, leaving those law firms with only niche work. If law
firms become increasingly specialized, then billable hours should become less
common (again, all else equal). This is so because clients will less be able to
monitor specialist lawyers, and the billable hour will therefore be less useful
for mitigating residual losses. Therefore, the effect of growth in corporate
legal departments depends on the character of the change. However, this
prediction provides another prospective basis on which to test the validity of
the monitoring model.
Finally and most importantly, critics and practitioners should be
circumspect about advocating the switch to alternative fees. Billable hours
incur residual losses, but so would any principal-agent arrangement. And
billable hours have the considerable advantage that experienced principals can
mitigate their residual loss by monitoring, which is much more difficult with
alternative fees. This is not to endorse any one billing method, since each
principal and agent must negotiate to minimize agency costs according to their
own circumstances. This Article simply observes that the billable hour was
born for a reason, and it argues that the reports of its death have been greatly
exaggerated.77

77.

Cf 3 ALBERT BIGELOW PAINE, MARK TWAIN: A BIOGRAPHY 1039 (1912) ("[T]he

report of my death has been grossly exaggerated.").
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